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ABSTRACT. Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in 
poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how 
parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. 
The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may 
arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in 
favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in 
India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be 
strongly affected by economic inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the role of political parties in local governments in developing countries? Are they forces 
for social change, or vehicles of patronage? The significance of democratically elected local 
councils in the developing world has grown dramatically in recent decades, making it essential to 
understand how local governments work and what explains the wide differences in performance 
between them (Manor 1999, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Parties are key players in both local 
and national democracies almost everywhere and knowing how they function is essential for 
understanding the preconditions for good governance. 
This paper investigates the role of political parties in local governments by studying 
clientelism based on party membership. The paper discusses why political clientelism might be 
important and argues that clientelism is likely to be most prevalent in underdeveloped and unequal 
communities. These conjectures are then tested on data from a survey of households and local 
governments in four South Indian states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu. A data set collected by Tim Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao is exploited (Besley 
et. al. 2004, Besley, Pande and Rao 2005a,b). 
The operational definition of party-based clientelism is simply the strength of the 
partial correlation between membership in the party of the local government leader (the 
“President”) and beneficiary status in a policy program. An advantage of this measure is that both 
party membership and beneficiary status are fairly objective and easy-to-measure variables. This 
stands in contrast to more commonly used measures of the quality of governance, which are often 
based on informants' subjective judgments. For example, the "Governance Indicators" published by 
the World Bank rely "exclusively on subjective or perceptions based measures of governance" 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2004, p. 19). As Esteban and Ray (2006) point out, such measures 
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are vulnerable to bias stemming from "rationalizations" of the observed performance of an 
economy. 
Results show that in two out of the four states sampled (Kerala and Tamil Nadu), 
members of the President's party are more likely to benefit from an important poverty alleviation 
program than others, and that this effect is more important than other forms of discrimination, such 
as discrimination based on shared language, religion, caste or place of living. The presence of a 
strong interaction effect between economic inequality and party affiliation is demonstrated. In equal 
communities the influence of political clientelism is negligible but in unequal ones it is strong and 
quantitatively important. The main conclusions emerging from the paper are therefore, first, that 
party-based clientelism is empirically important, and second, that it is strongly affected by 
economic inequality. In Tamil Nadu, substantial heterogeneity across political parties in the 
employment of political clientelism is observed. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the significance and 
determinants of political clientelism. Section 3 reviews existing literature and section 4 gives 
background information and presents the dataset. Section 5 defines key variables. Section 6 
provides descriptive statistics, and section 7 presents estimation results. Section 8 concludes. 
 
3.  The potential importance of party based clientelism 
The politics of developing countries are often described as “clientelist” (e.g. Powell 1970, 
Lemarchand and Legg 1972, Kurer 1996, Wantchekon 2003). Clientelist politics is defined by the 
important role played by patron-client relations between political leaders (patrons) and specific 
groups or individuals (clients). In these relationships, public resources are allocated to clients in 
exchange for political support. Why does this phenomenon arise, and why does membership of 
political parties potentially play a role? 
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 From the point of view of ordinary citizens in poor countries, patron-client 
relationships serve as insurance devices and as means of obtaining access to scarce resources. It is 
perhaps more difficult to understand why political leaders in a democracy spend scarce resources on 
nurturing networks of clients. According to standard voting models, political leaders who care about 
re-election should focus on pleasing “swing voters”, rather than loyalists (Downs 1957, Lindbeck 
and Weibull 1987). A main reason for a purely office-seeking candidate to deviate from these 
principles stems from the fact that candidates for political office need to run electoral campaigns. 
The services offered by clients may come in the form of campaign contributions, in addition to 
voting for the candidate. Even poor clients may contribute to electoral campaigns, by providing 
labour and by talking positively about the candidate in informal contexts. Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) show in a theoretical model how special interest groups and office-motivated politicians may 
trade campaign contributions for policy favours. Markussen (2009) discusses how this model can be 
adapted to describing the relationship between candidates for political office and rank-and-file party 
members.  
Why would political clients want to be members of their patron’s party? If party leaders’ 
motive for maintaining networks of clients is to run effective campaigns, then it is natural to expect 
clients to be party members. The party is the organizational frame around political campaigns. Even 
if the motive for clientelism is simply vote buying, patrons may still favour clients who join their 
party because the secret ballot makes it difficult to target benefits to clients directly based on voting. 
Joining a party can be regarded as device for committing oneself to voting for the party since party 
members allow themselves to be exposed to increased amounts of propaganda, for example in party 
meetings (the participation in which can be monitored). 
What determines the prevalence of political clientelism? Robinson and Verdier (2002) 
argue that it is fostered by low productivity and high inequality. The reason is, essentially, that these 
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factors lower the price demanded by potential clients to enter into patron-client relationships, 
relative to the resources commanded by potential patrons. Low productivity leads to poverty, which 
increases the demand for the security offered by patrons. Inequality typically means that potential 
patrons command large amounts of resources relative to potential clients and are therefore more 
easily able to afford paying for their loyalty and services.   
      
3. Related studies 
A number of authors have pointed to the importance of patron-client relations in 
general, and political clientelism in particular, in India (e.g. Kumar 1965, Weiner 1967, Brass 1990, 
Kohli 1990, Platteau 1995). Based on the large role played by the state in the provision of services 
and jobs, and on the high level of discretion enjoyed by officials in charge of distributing resources, 
Chandra (2004) describes India as a "patronage democracy". 
The present paper follows in the footsteps of other empirical studies of capture and 
clientelism in local government in developing countries, summarised by Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2006). A number of recent, empirical studies have in different ways focused on capture of local 
governments in India. Using the same dataset as here, Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) find that GP 
politicians favour themselves and their fellow villagers in the allocation of public resources. For 
example, politician households are more likely than other households to benefit from the poverty 
alleviation program also studied in this paper (the BPL scheme). However, more educated 
politicians are less prone to nepotism. Besley, Pande and Rao also report that households affiliated 
with the local political leader’s party are more likely than others to benefit from the program. 
However, this result is reported only in a footnote (p.24), without further discussion. The present 
paper follows up on that result by including a number of additional, relevant control variables, 
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exploring interaction effects and heterogeneity across states and parties, and by offering 
interpretations. 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) study local government provision of infrastructure in 
an India-wide sample of Gram Panchayats. They find that the introduction of local democracy 
reduces "elite capture", in the sense that it leads to more pro-landless public investment. In a similar 
vein, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003) find that effective, political competition leads to pro-poor 
policies. They show in a study of local governments in West Bengal that more equal vote shares 
between the two major political blocs leads to higher levels of pro-poor land reform. Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2006b) study the inter-GP and intra-village targeting of public resources to the poor in 
West Bengal and find few signs of elite capture within villages. On the other hand, they find that 
inter-GP allocation patterns are negatively correlated with poverty and inequality. They also 
investigate whether political favouritism affects inter-community allocations, but find no evidence 
in favour of this hypothesis. Bardhan et al. (2008) find similar results as Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2006b), but also test whether respondents who voted for the party holding a majority in the GP 
receive additional resources. This hypothesis is not supported. 
In sum, the literature on local government in India has in different ways dealt with 
government capture and clientelism along lines of class and political position. However, apart from 
the footnote in Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a), clientelism based on party affiliation is unexplored. 
   
4. Empirical setting and data 
4.1  Background 
The empirical analysis exploits data from a survey of local governments, villages and 
households in rural areas of the four southernmost states of India: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The constitutional basis for decentralised government in India has existed 
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almost since the country gained independence in 1947, although in most states local governments 
were extremely weak until 1993 when the constitution was amended to reinforce the importance of 
local level democracy. The data used in the paper cover the lowest level of government, the Gram 
Panchayat (GP). A GP typically comprises between one and five villages, and has a few thousand 
inhabitants. The responsibilities of GPs vary between states, but in all states they serve at least two 
main functions. First, they provide public goods such as roads, street lights and water supply. 
Second, they select individual beneficiaries for state and federal welfare schemes (Besley et. al. 
2005). It is this second function that we draw upon to investigate the effects of political clientelism. 
The GP is subdivided into wards, and elections for GP councils are held at the ward 
level. The leader of the GP is called the President. In Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu the President 
is elected directly, while in Karnataka and Kerala the elected ward representatives nominate the 
President. A council is elected for a fixed term of five years. Council members and Presidents can 
seek reelection, but the same seat cannot be reserved for the same group in two consecutive 
elections. In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the political party affiliations of candidates in Gram 
Panchayat elections are not listed on the ballots (Karnataka State Election Commission, Suri 2002). 
Party members are not banned from running and in general most voters are likely to be aware of the 
party affiliation of leading candidates. Nevertheless, this rule may potentially affect the prevalence 
of party based clientelism by weakening the link between party-based election propaganda and 
electoral behaviour. 
A genuinely competitive multiparty democracy is functioning in all four states, at state 
as well as local levels. The Indian National Congress (INC) is a central player in at least three of the 
sampled states. The only exception is Tamil Nadu, where the INC has not controlled the state 
government for several decades. Apart from that, the politics of the four states are dominated by 
different parties. In Andhra Pradesh, the regional Telugu Desam Party is the major player, 
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challenged mainly by the INC. In Karnataka, the main competitors of the INC are the Janata Party, 
and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In Kerala, the main parties are the INC and the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist). In Tamil Nadu, several regional parties compete for power, the principal 
ones being the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (AIADMK). 
 
4.2  Dataset 
The dataset used in the paper was collected in 2002. Sampling took place in several 
stages. Districts were selected in pairs on either side of state borders, so that district pairs with 
similar historical and socioeconomic characteristics were selected. More specifically, pairs of 
districts from two states were chosen so that each was part of the same political entity before the 
restructuring of state borders in 1956. Hence, the sample is not representative at the state level. 
Rather, the strength of the sampling strategy is that it builds in controls for historical factors that 
might influence current outcomes. Nine districts were sampled (one district entered the sample 
twice) and subsequently a total of 201 GPs were sampled from these districts. In each of the GPs, 
all villages were sampled if the GP had no more than three villages. If there were more than three 
villages, the President's village and two randomly selected villages were sampled. In each village a 
survey was administered to about three local politicians: the President, the Vice President and an 
ordinary council member. Village surveys were conducted to obtain data on local, public 
infrastructure, land and caste distribution. In a random sample of 101 GPs, household interviews 
were conducted in all the sampled villages. In total, 544 politician households and 5,180 ordinary 
household were interviewed. At least four scheduled caste or scheduled tribe households were 
sampled in each village. For further information on the sampling strategy, see World Bank (2005) 
and Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a,b). 
 9 
For the purposes of this study, data on households, as well as Presidents and villages 
are needed. Therefore, only those villages where household surveys were conducted are included in 
the analysis. The sample of politicians is used to construct variables such as whether respondents 
belong to the same party as the President, but the politician sample is not included in the sample 
used for estimation. Doing so would render the sample unrepresentative.  
 
5. Variable definitions 
The analysis follows Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a, 2007) and uses the allocation of 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards as the dependent variable. The BPL card was introduced by the 
national government in 1997 as attempt to improve targeting of the public food distribution system. 
BPL-card holders obtain the right to buy subsidised food from the public food distribution system. 
In addition, most GP administered housing-, employment and other welfare programs restrict access 
to BPL card holders. Having a BPL card is estimated to increase the income of an agricultural 
labourer household by about 5 percent in the four sampled states (Besley, Pande and Rao 2005a). 
Choosing BPL card holders is one of the most important tasks of the GP. The GP is allocated a 
fixed quota of BPL cards from authorities at the district level. It is subsequently supposed to carry 
out a household survey to determine who is eligible for the program, and produce a preliminary list 
of eligible households. The list is then officially required to be finalised in a village meeting open to 
all citizens, a so-called Gram Sabha. However, these meetings are often not held, and only about 22 
percent of the respondents in the survey have ever attended one. In practice the GP council 
members and officials, in particular the President, have considerable discretion in choosing BPL 
beneficiaries. In sum, the dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the value one if the 
household has a BPL card. 
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The explanatory variable of primary interest is an indicator taking the value one if the 
household head is a member of the same party as the President. The measure of political clientelism 
applied is then the partial correlation between membership in the President's party and beneficiary 
status in the BPL program. 
 The discussion in section 2 highlighted the potential importance of underdevelopment 
and inequality as factors leading to political clientelism. In terms of inequality, high quality data is 
available, since the village survey asked respondents to record the entire land distribution of their 
village. More precisely, respondents were asked to report how many households fall into each of the 
following brackets: no land, between 0 and 1 acres, between 1.1 and 5 acres, between 5.1 and 10 
acres, between 10.1 and 25 acres, and above 25 acres. The GP land gini coefficient is estimated by 
pooling the data from the sampled villages in each GP. The interval midpoint value is assigned to 
each household in a bracket, and inequality is estimated.1 To measure levels of development, GP-
averages of household heads’ education in years and household ownership of durable goods are 
used (see notes to Table 1).  
 
6. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the sampled households. Some 22 percent of households 
are BPL card holders. The fraction of households where the household head is a member of a 
political party is 31 percent. This is a remarkably high level of political participation. Calculations 
based on the 1990-91 World Values Survey show that in most Western countries, less than 10 
percent of the adult population are party members.2 Only about half of party members are members 
of the same party as the President.  
There is considerable variation in land distribution among communities. The GP Gini 
coefficient of cultivated land has a mean of 0.63 and a standard deviation of 0.15.  
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics     
  All households Hh head party 
member 
Hh head member of 
Presidents party 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean 
     BPL-card holder 0.22 0.41 0.36 0.42 
     Hh head member of political party 0.31 0.46 1.00 1.00 
Hh head member of President's party 0.14 0.34 0.44 1.00 
Family political history 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.09 
     Gram Panchayat gini of cultivated land 0.63 0.15 0.66 0.65 
Gram Panchayat landlessness rate 0.37 0.22 0.43 0.42 
     Scheduled caste or scheduled tribe 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.24 
Head's education (years) 3.42 4.14 3.72 3.14 
Agricultural land owned (acres) 2.07 4.38 1.79 1.55 
Hh size 5.33 2.39 5.30 5.27 
Age of household head 49.10 13.81 47.95 47.53 
Durable goods (index)* 11.67 13.01 12.70 11.54 
Female household head 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.08 
Hh head unmarried 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.02 
Hh head divorced 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 
Hh head widowed 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.08 
     Main source of income: 
    
Selfemployment in agriculture 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.30 
Agricultural labour 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.24 
Casual labour (coolie) 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.25 
Permanent wage labour 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.06 
Selfemployment in non-agriculture 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.07 
Rents, remittances, interests, dividends and 
pensions 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.03 
Other 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.04 
Note: N = 5,180. 
  *This variable is a weighted sum of the durable goods owned by the households. I have not had access to price data which could 
bed used to construct weights, and the weights are therefore based on casual estimates of relative value (This method was also 
used by La Ferrara (2002) for constructing a key asset inequality variable for a sample of Tanzanian households. For overlapping 
goods, my weights are roughly proportional to hers). The weights are: Pressure cooker, fan, bicycle, pressure lamp, desert cooler: 
2,  Radio, transistor, cassette player: 3, Watch, black and white TV: 4, Sewing machine, music system, color TV, autorickshaw, 
refrigerator, freezer, washing machine, camera: 5, Motor cycle, moped, telephone set: 6, Motor car: 7. 
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics specifically for members of political parties, 
and for members of the President's party. Consistent with the view that party-based clientelism 
exists, party members, particularly members of the President's party, are much more likely than the 
average household to benefit from the BPL program. This key result is explored further in section 
7.1.  
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Table 2: Party affiliation and beneficiary status in a poverty alleviation program 
    Dependent variable: Hh has BPL card 
 
All All   
Andhra 
Pradesh Karnataka Kerala 
Tamil 
Nadu 
  OLS 2SLS   OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Member of President's party 0.06 0.736 
 
-0.052 0.013 0.089 0.080 
 
(2.67)*** (1.69)* 
 
(1.06) (0.39) (2.42)** (1.83)* 
Member of other party 0.018 0.23 
 
-0.004 -0.014 0.026 -0.014 
 
(0.92) (1.66)* 
 
(0.09) (0.55) (0.81) (0.52) 
Family political history -0.038 -0.131 
 
0.043 -0.065 0.002 -0.078 
 
(1.94)* (2.04)** 
 
(0.87) (2.77)*** (0.04) (2.10)** 
Scheduled caste/scheduled tribe 0.115 0.084 
 
0.041 0.062 0.228 0.122 
 
(6.34)*** (2.94)*** 
 
(0.76) (2.63)** (5.66)*** (3.28)*** 
Education of head in years -0.003 -0.002 
 
-0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 
 
(2.25)** (1.12) 
 
(1.26) (0.29) (0.87) (2.52)** 
Agricultural land owned, acres -0.003 -0.002 
 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.019 -0.01 
 
(2.34)** (1.98)** 
 
(0.78) (1.25) (3.29)*** (4.72)*** 
Household size 0.005 0.005 
 
0.005 0.001 0.009 0.008 
 
(2.23)** (2.01)** 
 
(0.85) (0.57) (1.69)* (1.43) 
Age of head 0.001 0.001 
 
0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 
(2.01)** (1.98)** 
 
(0.08) (1.82)* (1.62) (0.59) 
Index of durable goods ownership -0.002 -0.002 
 
0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 
(5.58)*** (3.92)*** 
 
(0.08) (1.88)* (4.40)*** (0.90) 
Female household head 0.046 0.065 
 
0.086 0.018 0.048 -0.005 
 
(1.91)* (2.31)** 
 
(0.92) (0.91) (0.64) (0.09) 
Same religion as President 0.032 0.033 
 
-0.041 -0.012 0.045 -0.032 
 
(1.66)* (1.40) 
 
(1.58) (0.36) (1.64) (1.00) 
Same caste as President 0.037 0.028 
 
0.081 0.031 0.067 -0.031 
 
(2.00)** (1.40) 
 
(1.03) (1.75)* (1.88)* (1.09) 
Same village as President 0.005 
  
0.040 0.002 0.027 -0.023 
 
(0.33) 
  
(0.85) (0.08) (0.93) (0.85) 
Same occupation as President 0.025 
  
0.005 0.013 0.024 -0.006 
 
(1.39) 
  
(0.08) (0.73) (0.52) (0.24) 
Same level of educ. as President -0.019 
  
-0.088 0.015 -0.016 -0.013 
 
(1.45) 
  
(2.61)** (0.92) (0.55) (0.47) 
Constant 0.068 0.336 
 
0.292 0.037 0.003 0.217 
 
(2.12)** (1.78)* 
 
(2.68)** (0.95) (0.04) (3.46)*** 
Fixed effects GP GP 
 
GP GP GP GP 
        Observations 4,844 4,844 
 
594 1,715 1,198 1,337 
R-squared 0.36 
  
0.38 0.35 0.27 0.46 
Hansen J-test of instrument exogeneity (p-value) 0.73 
     F-test of excluded variables in first-stage 
regression  4.24           
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. In the 2SLS regression, 
membership of President's party is instrumented with indicators for living in the same village as the President and 
for having the same (non-political) occupation and level of education as the President, respectively. Indicators for 
marital status and main source of income are included but not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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7. Estimation results 
7.1  Existence of party-based clientelism 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating regression models for BPL beneficiary status. The first two 
regressions pool all observations, while the last four columns present separate regressions for each 
of the four states. In addition to the main variable of interest, membership of the President’s party, a 
number of control variables are also included. First, we might worry that membership of the 
President's party is merely a proxy for the official eligibility criterion for participation in the 
program, which is poverty. To take account of this objection, a number of variables known to be 
correlated with poverty are introduced, namely: (i) whether the household belongs to a scheduled 
caste or a scheduled tribe, (ii) education of the household head in years, (iii) amount of agricultural 
land owned by the household, (iv) household size, (v) age, gender and marital status of the 
household head, (vi) an index of durable goods ownership, and (vii) dummies for the household's 
main source of income. To save space, coefficients on marital status and source of income are not 
shown. When these variables are introduced, most of them have the expected sign, and many are 
significant. As noted by Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) the significant effect of variables correlated 
with poverty indicates that, even if various sorts of capture and clientelism exist, GPs do in fact 
achieve some amount of targeting. 
 Second, we can imagine that membership of the President's party functions as a proxy 
for being a politician in the GP council. A variable measuring whether a member of the household's 
family holds or has held a political position is therefore introduced ("members of the family" are not 
necessarily members of the household). This variable enters with a negative coefficient.3 
Third, it is necessary to check that membership of the President's party is more 
beneficial than membership of other parties. A dummy for being a member of other parties than the 
President's is therefore introduced. This variable enters with a positive sign, and it is significant in 
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one specifications. In both regressions using the full sample, the point estimate of the coefficient on 
membership of other parties is much lower than the coefficient on membership of the President's 
party.  
Fourth, it is possible to imagine that membership of the President's party is a proxy for 
other kinds of affiliation with the President, such as shared religion, caste, place of living, 
occupational- or educational background. To test this hypothesis, dummies for sharing religion, 
caste, occupation (apart from being the President), level of education and village of residence with 
the President are entered.4 The coefficients on the variables are in most cases smaller than the 
coefficient on membership of the President's party, although the hypothesis that the coefficients on 
membership of the President's party, same religion and same caste as the President are equal cannot 
be rejected according to statistical criteria. Same religion and same caste as the President are both 
significant in the first regression in table 2. This gives some indication that favouritism along 
religious and caste lines plays a role in the Panchayats, in line with the arguments made in Chandra 
(2004). On the other hand, there is no evidence of favouritism along educational, occupational or 
village lines. 
 Finally, to control for unobservable characteristics at the state, district or GP level, 
such as the total number of BPL cards allocated to districts and GPs, GP fixed effects are 
introduced. 
The member of President's party-variable is positive and significant in both 
regressions using the full sample. Hence, the correlation between membership of the governing 
party and beneficiary status, reported in Table 1, is robust to including the set of control variables. 
While the results in Table 2 are all based on linear probability models, qualitatively similar results 
emerge from using a probit model instead (results not shown).  
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7.2  Endogenous party membership 
We might worry that membership of the President's party is endogenous. Membership 
of the President's party could be affected by BPL beneficiary status if beneficiaries tend to join the 
President's party out of gratitude for receiving the BPL card, or because they read the benefits as a 
signal of the party's competence. In regression 2, indicators for sharing, respectively, occupational- 
and educational background and village of residence with the President are used as instruments for 
membership of the President’s party. The idea is, first, that these variables may affect the decision 
to join the President’s party. Citizens may feel best represented by a party leader with the same 
background as themselves. Second, the insignificant coefficients on the dummies for sharing 
village, occupation and educational background with the President in regression 1 indicate that 
these variables do not have a direct effect on the allocation of BPL cards. At the bottom of Table 2, 
tests of instrument performance are reported. First, the Hansen J test reveals no evidence against the 
assumption of instrument exogeneity (p = .73). Second, an F-test of instrument relevance shows 
that the instruments are jointly significant in the first-stage regression (p=.01). The value of the F-
statistic, however, is only 4.24. Staiger and Stock (1997) state that as a rule of thumb the F-value 
should be at least 10. Hence, the instruments are somewhat weak. Results show that the coefficient 
on membership of the President’s party remains positive and significant at the ten percent level. The 
main concerns are the fact that the coefficient is very imprecisely estimated (the standard error is 
.43) and that the point estimate is unexpectedly high. Membership of the President’s party is 
estimated to increase the probability of holding a BPL card by 73 percentage points. The high 
estimate may result from the weak instruments (Stock and Yogo 2004). Still, the fact that the 
estimate is positive and significant strengthens the view that the correlation between membership of 
the President’s party and BPL beneficiary status is not caused by reverse causality. In the analysis 
below we revert to treating membership of the President’s party as exogenous.  
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7.3. Heterogeneity across states 
Regressions 3 to 6 in Table 2 reveal substantial heterogeneity across states in the prevalence of 
political clientelism. In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, there is no significant effect of membership 
of the President’s party on BPL beneficiary status. In Kerala and Tamil Nadu, on the other hand, the 
effect is positive and significant. One potential explanation is based on the difference in electoral 
rules referred to above, which means that candidates in GP elections run on party labels in Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu, but not in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. However, as discussed, most candidates 
in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh do in fact belong to political parties and the party affiliation of 
potential GP presidents is likely to be largely common knowledge. Therefore, this explanation may 
not be fully satisfactory.  
 Alternatively, variation between states may result from more fundamental differences 
in the development of patronage relations. Patron-client relations have been important in India since 
ancient times (e.g. , Kumar 1965, Platteau 1995). However, a transformation of the nature of these 
relations has been taking place for some time. As Graziano (1973) describes for Southern Italy, 
based on the concepts developed by Weingrod (1968), there has been a transition from “clientelism 
of the notables” to “political party-directed clientelism” (Widlund 2000 points out the relevance of 
this distinction for India). The most influential patrons used to be high-caste landowners, 
maintaining clientelist relations with local peasants based on the exchange of insurance and credit 
for labor and loyalty. Increasingly, however, the most important patrons are instead party leaders, 
exchanging public resources for political support. The mode of operation employed by the 
previously hegemonic Congress party arguably represents a way-station in this transition. The 
Congress in many cases exploited traditional patron-client relations by turning local patrons into 
clients of the party, and thereby gaining the clients of these persons as “vote banks” (e.g. Kohli 
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1987 p.62). Now, Kerala and Tamil Nadu were among the first states in India to overthrow the 
traditional Congress system. In Tamil Nadu, Congress lost control of the State Assembly in 1967 
and has not regained it since. In Kerala, Congress first lost power already in 1957. The party has 
regained control of the State government a number of times, but the pace-setters in terms of policy 
as well as style of politics have been mostly been the CPI(M) (cf. Alexander 1989). In abandoning 
Congress hegemony, Kerala and Tamil Nadu arguably completed the transition from clientelism of 
the notables to party-based clientelism. Political clientelism is a strategy for political parties to 
obtain support, and to a large extent it was probably this strategy that parties in Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu used successfully to gain power. This may explain why party-based clientelism is particularly 
prevalent in these states. 
Qualitative evidence on the importance of political clientelism in Kerala is provided 
by Platteau and Abraham (2002) who report that, although Kerala is famous for developmental 
achievements, its local government program "suffers from an important weakness in that it has 
become a platform for political favouritism in a country plagued by excessive party politicisation 
down to the local level" (p. 126). In a similar vein, Tharakan (2004) concludes that "the evolution of 
modern Kerala society and politics resulted in a process of party-politicisation of associational life, 
which subjected it to the clientelistic principle of winning support by way of partisan favours". In 
Tamil Nadu, Subramanian (1999, p.67) reports that “crucial Dravidianist policies (...) were 
clientelist as they targeted specific groups which gave the ruling party their support in return..”. 
Widlund (2000) writes about the AIADMK party that “the members are aware of the patronage 
potential that comes with belonging to the ruling party and they expect to share the benefits”.  
In contrast, a traditional style of politics, where political parties use local notables as 
intermediaries, has until recently continued to dominate political life in Karnataka. (Crook and 
Manor 1998, Harriss 1999). Andhra Pradesh (AP) represents a mixed case. Harriss (1999) groups 
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AP along with Karnataka as States with “middle caste/class dominated regimes, where the Congress 
has been effectively challenged but has not collapsed”. In contrast, he groups Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu (along with West Bengal) as “states in which lower castes/classes are more strongly 
represented in political regimes where the Congress lost its dominance at an early stage”. However, 
politics in Andhra Pradesh are in some respect similar to those in Tamil Nadu. A regional party (the 
TDP) has adopted a populist approach and effectively challenged the dominance of the Congress. 
Congress maintained a stronger role in AP than in Tamil Nadu, but the populist strategies of the 
TDP have in many ways been similar to the strategies of the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu. There 
may be a different reason why political clientelism was not a prominent feature of Gram Panchayat 
politics in Andhra Pradesh at the time of the survey. During this period, the TDP government in 
Andhra Pradesh focused heavily on implementing the so-called “Janmabhoomi” program. By 
introducing local water user group, women’s groups and other special-purpose bodies, this program 
essentially promoted a parallel structure of local government, largely bypassing the panchayats. It is 
plausible that the TDP used the Janmabhoomi system, rather than the Gram Panchayats, to channel 
patronage to its supporters (Suri 2002, p.44). 
 
7.4  Heterogeneity across political parties 
Some political parties may engage more heavily in political clientelism than others. Table 3 
investigates the effect of membership of the Presidents party separately for each of the four main 
parties in the two states where political clientelism was detected. The same set of control variables 
as in Table 2 is included. In Kerala, the table shows that the coefficient on membership of the 
President’s party is roughly similar for Congress- and CPI(M) headed GPs. Both estimates are 
statistically insignificant, but this can be ascribed simply to the drop in sample size. The sizes of the 
coefficients are similar to the estimate for Kerala in Table 2. Hence, party-based clientelism appears 
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to be a strategy employed in equal measure by both of the main parties in Kerala. In contrast, the 
estimates for the two main parties in Tamil Nadu, the DMK and the AIADMK, differ sharply. The 
estimate for GPs with AIADMK presidents is positive and significant, while the estimate for DMK 
headed GPs is essentially zero.  
 
Table 3: Political clientelism and President's party 
     Dependent variable: Hh has BPL card 
State Kerala   Tamil Nadu 
President's party Congress CPI(M)   AIADMK DMK 
Member of President's party 0.077 0.067 
 
0.083 0.001 
 
(1.53) (1.07) 
 
(1.71)* (0.02) 
      Control variables as in table 2 Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Fixed effects GP GP 
 
GP GP 
      Observations 599 359 
 
747 198 
R-squared 0.29 0.37 
 
0.52 0.60 
Note: OLS regressions. t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the village level. 
* significant at 10% 
      
One explanation may be that the AIADMK was in charge of the State government at the time. 
There may be more room for local leaders to hand out patronage when fellow party members are in 
charge at higher levels of government. However, the different styles of politics adopted by the two 
Dravidian parties may also play a role. Subramanian (1999) describe both parties as “populist”, but 
distinguish between the “assertive” populism employed by the DMK and the “paternalist” populism 
of the AIADMK. Assertive populists mainly focus on distributing patronage in the form of jobs, 
reservations at universities and similar. Clients typically belong to the minority of subjects who 
command the minimum level of resources necessary to be able to benefit from this type of services. 
Paternalist populists, on the other hand, hand out patronage in the form of welfare goods to broad 
segments of the population. The distribution of BPL cards as patronage is typical of a paternalist- 
but not of an assertive populist party. Hence, the difference between DMK and AIADMK reported 
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in Table 3 is consistent with Subramanians characterization of the two parties as, respectively, 
assertive- and paternalist populists. 
 
7.5. Determinants of political clientelism 
The discussion in section 2 suggests that inequality and low levels of economic 
development increase the incidence of political clientelism. Table 4 shows the results of entering 
measures of development and inequality, interacted with the member of President's party-variable 
into the BPL-allocation model. The regressions include the same controls as in columns 4 and 5 of 
table 2. The estimated coefficients on the control variables are not shown. In order to not loose the 
main effects of the GP-level measures of inequality and development, which are interesting in their 
own right, district fixed effects are used instead of GP fixed effects. GP fixed effects are 
reintroduced in regression 6. The entire sample is used. Very similar results emerge if only 
observations from Kerala an Tamil Nadu are included (not shown).  
The first column of Table 3 reveals a significant and numerically strong, positive 
interaction between membership of the President's party and the land gini. In fact, the model 
predicts that in completely equal communities (land gini = 0) there is a significant negative effect of 
being a member of the President's party (the coefficient on the same-party-as-President main effect 
is significant and negative). However, no GPs in the sample are close to complete equality. What 
should be emphasised is this: As GPs become more unequal, political clientelism is predicted to 
increase rapidly. Positive discrimination in favour of members of the President’s party is estimated 
to be present in GPs with a land gini above 0.4. Note from Table 1 that the average land gini is 0.63. 
The coefficient on the main effect of the land gini is negative, suggesting that as inequality 
increases, households who are not members of the governing political party become less likely to 
receive a BPL card. 
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Table 4: Determinants of party capture 
        Dependent variable: Household has BPL card 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Member of President's party -0.228 0.043 0.04 -0.207 -0.113 -0.145 
 
(2.82)*** (0.68) (0.67) (2.52)** (0.98) (1.65)* 
Member of President's party*Land gini 0.567 
  
0.689 0.381 0.320 
 
(4.23)*** 
  
(4.04)*** (2.06)** (2.22)** 
GP land gini -0.224 
  
-0.253 -0.114 
 
 
(2.64)*** 
  
(2.92)*** (0.38) 
 Member of President's party*GP education level 0.013 
 
0.021 
  
  
(0.96) 
 
(1.33) 
  GP education level 
 
0.026 
 
-0.010 
  
  
(1.61) 
 
(0.39) 
  Member of President's party*GP dur. good index 
 
0.008 -0.005 
  
   
(1.83)* (0.65) 
  GP durable goods index 
  
0.001 -0.001 
  
   
(0.36) (0.20) 
  
       Control variables as in table 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects District District District District District GP 
       Observations 4,844 4,844 4,844 4,844 4,704 4,704 
R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 
  Hansen J-test of instrument exogeneity (p-value) 
   
0.26 0.47 
F-test of excluded variables in first-stage regression  
     Land gini 
    
9.1 
 Interaction term         40.7 81.5 
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the village level. 
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
     
 
In columns 2 and 3 the average education level of household heads in the GP and the 
GP average of the durable goods index, respectively, and the interactions between these variables 
and membership of the President's party are entered. The coefficients on both interaction terms are 
positive, and the interaction between the GP-durable goods index and membership of the President's 
party is significant at the ten percent level. In column 4 all the interaction terms (and main effects) 
are entered in the same regression. The result is that the interaction between inequality and 
membership of the President's party remains significant and strong, while the two other interaction 
terms are completely insignificant. Similar results are obtained when a probit model is estimated 
and when the landlessness rate is used as the measure of inequality, rather than the land gini (results 
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not shown). As stated in the introduction, this is a main result: Party-based clientelism is much 
stronger in unequal than in equal communities. On the other hand, there is no evidence that it is 
affected by levels of economic development. 
  
7.6  Endogenous inequality 
The paper argues that inequality leads to clientelism, but higher levels of clientelism may also 
reinforce inequality, for example if the least resourceful households are excluded from patron-client 
relations. This possibility is taken into account by instrumenting current inequality with proxies for 
inequality in 1991, obtained from the 1991 Census of India. The Census included a classification of 
full-time workers according to industrial categories. In particular, it is possible to distinguish 
between people working on their own farm and other workers. It is assumed that workers employed 
on their own farm as a share of all workers is a good proxy for land inequality in 1991. If land is 
equally distributed, many people will be small farmers, working on their own farm. On the other 
hand, if many households have no or only very little land (i.e. land inequality is high), many will be 
working mainly on other people's farms, or outside agriculture. 
The share of workers employed on own family farms can be calculated for both 
women and men, and both these variables are used as instruments for inequality in 2002. 
Furthermore, because inequality is interacted with membership of the President's party, the 
interactions between membership of the President's party and the shares of workers employed on 
own farms are also used as instruments. 
Regressions 5 and 6 reports the results of this exercise, with district- and GP fixed 
effects. In the estimations with GP fixed effects, the main effect of inequality drop out because it is 
measured at the GP level. In both regressions the interaction between membership of the President's 
party and inequality remains significant and positive. 
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At the of bottom the table, tests of instrument exogeneity and relevance are reported. 
The Hansen J test of instrument exogeneity fails to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous. F-statistics for the tests of joint significance of the instruments in the first stage 
regressions are also provided. The instruments are below the rule-of-thumb value of 10 in one case, 
namely in the first stage regression for the main effect of the land gini. However, the shortfall is not 
large (F = 9.1). In sum, the IV estimations strengthen the case that higher inequality leads to higher 
levels of political clientelism. 
 
8. Conclusion and discussion 
The paper makes two main contributions. First, the existence of party-based political 
clientelism is demonstrated empirically in the context of local governments in India. Discrimination 
based on party membership is equally or more important than favouritism along lines of religion, 
caste, occupation, education and place of living. Substantial heterogeneity across states and political 
parties is uncovered. The measure of political clientelism applied is attractive. It is based on 
objective and easy-to-measure criteria, as opposed to the perceptions-based measures often applied 
in other studies of good governance. Second, the paper documents that political clientelism is 
strongly affected by inequality. In equal communities clientelism is unimportant, but in unequal 
communities it is pervasive. In contrast, there is little evidence that political clientelism is affected 
by economic development. 
The finding of party favouritism does not imply that political parties in general play a 
negative role in development. The two states where political clientelism was detected, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu, have done relatively well over the past 30 or 40 years in terms of reducing poverty 
(Ravallion and Datt 2002) and political parties have been instrumental in this progress in several 
ways, for example by eroding traditional, caste-based patterns of political dominance (Harriss 
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1999). It is possible to interpret political clientelism as a "necessary evil". Mobilizing the masses to 
effect change, such as the removal of a repressive social order, presents a massive collective action 
problem and perhaps the promise of private benefits is the only effective means of overcoming this 
obstacle (cf. Olson 1965). As discussed in section 7.3, political clientelism typically replaces 
previous, even more unequal relationships based on “clientelism of the notables”. This being said, 
the allocation of public resources according to criteria of political affiliation does not correspond 
well with traditional standards of democracy and good governance. If the benefits from a poverty 
alleviation program are targeted to members of the ruling party rather than to the poor, the program 
will not be effective in reducing poverty and improving intra-village distribution. 
Determinants of the decision to join a party have not been directly investigated in this 
paper. However, the findings indicate that it is often prudent to interpret data on civil society 
activity with a degree of skepticism. While high levels of participation in parties and other civil 
society organizations could indicate high levels of political awareness and desire to affect public 
life, rent seeking may also play a role. 
To some extent the paper serves as an antidote against the naive "small is beautiful"-
romanticism which is sometimes behind the push for decentralization. Governance failure exists in 
local as well as national governments. On the other hand, the paper should not be read as a 
recommendation against decentralised government. First, it is entirely possible that allocation biases 
are at least as strong at district-, state- or national levels as it is at the local level, as documented in 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) and Galasso and Ravallion (2005). Second, the results reported 
document that the poverty alleviation program under study is in fact to an important extent targeted 
to the poor. 
The results do indicate, however, that the success of decentralization is likely to 
depend on implementation of complementary policies, such as land reform, policies to secure 
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openness in political and administrative decision making, and reforms to strengthen the media. The 
call for land reform follows directly from the finding that more equal communities are less prone to 
political clientelism. The recommendations on introducing openness and strengthening the media 
stem from the fact that political clientelism is partly a result of local politicians' misuse of 
discretionary powers. 
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Notes 
1. The last, open bracket presents a special problem. However, only one household in the entire 
sample is in this bracket. It is assigned the value 30 acres. 
2. For example, the share of the adult population belonging to a political party or group is 2.0 
percent in Japan, 4.9 percent in Great Britain, 6.5 percent in Denmark and 14.5 percent in the 
United States (World Values Study Group, 1994). 
3. Besley, Pande and Rao (2005a) include the sample of elected officials in their estimation 
sample, whereas this paper does not. They find that households with members who are currently 
GP politicians are more likely than others to be program beneficiaries. My results, on the other 
hand, show that households where someone in the (extended) family is or was a politician are 
less likely than other to benefit. The difference between the results could be explained by the 
fact that the tendency for politicians to be from an economically privileged background was 
stronger in the past than it is today (in part because of the reservation system). 
4. Apart from the variables indicating whether a households belongs to a scheduled caste or –tribe, 
data on caste was recorded in “open coding”. Answers were not coded in accordance with a 
predefined list of castes. This entails some inconsistencies in the data, since different, local 
names and spelling conventions are often used for the same caste. After correcting for these 
inconsistencies to the extent possible, the 5,180 households in the survey are classified as 
belonging to 297 different castes. 21 percent of respondents belong to the same caste as the GP 
president. While this estimate may to some extent be biased downward due to the 
inconsistencies mentioned, the level of magnitude appears realistic. 
The level-of education variables distinguishes between three categories: No schooling; 1 to 6 
years of schooling; and more than six years of schooling. The variable takes the value one if the 
household head is in the same category as the President, and zero otherwise. 
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